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Abstract
The poor performance of credit ratings on structured nance products has
prompted investigation into the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in designing
and marketing these products. We analyze a two-period reputation model where
a CRA both designs and rates securities that are sold to di¤erent clienteles: un-
constrained investors and investors constrained by minimum quality requirements.
When quality requirements for constrained investors are higher, rating ination
increases. Rating ination decreases if the quality of the asset pool is higher. Se-
curities for both types of investors may have inated ratings. The motivation for
pooling assets derives from tailoring to clienteles and from reputational incentives.
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has prompted much investigation into the role of credit-rating
agencies (CRAs). With the dramatic increase in the use of structured nance products,
the agencies quickly expanded their business and earned outsize prots (Moodys, for
example, tripled its prots between 2002 and 2006). Ratings quality seems to have
su¤ered, as structured nance products were increasingly given top ratings shortly before
the nancial markets collapsed. In this paper, we ask how the design of such products is
inuenced by CRAs, and how their structure changes with market incentives.
The design of structured nance products is marked by close collaboration between
issuers and rating agencies. Issuers depend on rating agencies to certify quality and to
be able to sell to regulated investors. Beyond directly paying CRAs for ratings (the
issuer pays system), Gri¢ n and Tang (2012) write that The CRA and underwriter
may engage in discussion and iteration over assumptions made in the valuation process.
Agencies also provide their models to issuers even before the negotiations take place
(Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009). These products are characterized by careful selection of
the underlying asset pool and private information about asset quality.
We present a reputation-based two-period model of rating structured products. Each
period an issuer has a set of good and bad assets that it can put into multiple pools
and issue securities against. The CRA is long-lived and may be of two types, truthful
or opportunistic. Reputation for the CRA consists of the probability that investors
perceive it to be truthful. This perception can change according to inferences from
ratings and security performance. There are two types of rational investors1, constrained
and unconstrained. Constrained investors need the quality of securities to be above a
certain level, while unconstrained investors can purchase any type of security.
We present several ndings on the drivers of ratings ination. First, when quality
requirements for constrained investors are higher, rating ination increases. The tighter
requirements make it more di¢ cult to sell securities, decreasing the benets of maintain-
1By rational, we mean that they make inferences based on available information using Bayesrule
when possible and maximize their payo¤ given their constraints.
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ing reputation for the future. This implies that tighter regulation of constrained investors
may have negative equilibrium e¤ects on the quality of assets sold. Second, if the qual-
ity of the asset pool is higher, ratings ination decreases, as there is a larger reward
for maintaining reputation. This provides a link between fundamental asset values and
ratings ination, suggesting that ratings quality will be countercyclical.2 Third, rating
ination can occur in securities meant for both constrained and unconstrained investors.
When quality requirements for constrained investors are higher, they will be sold fewer
securities and ination will spill into securities for unconstrained investors.
We provide two new motivations for the pooling of assets. First, in our model struc-
turing motives derive from the need to tailor products for constrained investors. Second,
a CRA can balance the informational advantage over investors with the need to maintain
its reputation by choosing the right mix of good and bad assets to include.
The key building blocks of our model are as follows:
 The ability to design the securities: Assets can be combined into multiple pools,
with securities issued against each pool, and/or retained by the issuer. The design
is constrained by the incentive to pass o¤ bad securities as good ones (a lemons
problem) and the demands of investors, but bu¤eted by the possibility of milking
reputation.
 Reputation concerns for CRAs: As rating agencies executives often argue, CRAs
are concerned about maintaining their reputation for providing timely and accurate
assessments of default risk.
 Clientele e¤ects: A principal motivation for securitization is to apportion risk to
investor groups with heterogeneous preferences for risk. The obvious example of
this was the increased demand for safe investments in the 2000s by regulated entities
(e.g. banks, pension funds, insurance companies).
There is substantial evidence of asymmetric information and strategic asset pool se-
lection for structured nance products. Downing, Ja¤ee, and Wallace (2009) compare
2This is consistent with theoretical (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013) and empirical (Auh, 2013) studies
of rating accuracy over the business cycle. We discuss this further in the text.
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the performance of pools of mortgages that are pass-through MBS with no tranching
with securitized REMICs (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits) with tranching.
The extra layer of securitization and anonymity in sales allows for a selection of worse
performing pools due to private information. This is shown to be true with ex-post per-
formance data. Moreover, there is a lemons spreaddue to rational discounting of these
securities. An, Deng, and Gabriel (2011) show that portfolio lenders use private informa-
tion to pass o¤ lower quality loans to commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS).
Conduit lenders, who originate loans for direct sale into securitization markets do not
select loans and hence have higher quality loans conditioning on the observables. The
analysis shows a lemons discount for portfolio loans. This lemons discount is lower for
multifamily loans, which have lower levels of uncertainty and lender private information
than retail, o¢ ce, and industrial loans. Elul (2011) demonstrates that securitized mort-
gages perform worse than portfolio loans, with the largest di¤erences in prime mortgages
in private (non-GSE) securitizations, consistent with the presence of adverse selection.
Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2011) nd that the MBS deals that were
most likely to underperform were the ones with more interest-only loans (because of lim-
ited performance history) and lower documentation, that is, loans that were more opaque
or di¢ cult to evaluate.
We nd that rating ination is an important element of structured nance. In the data,
Gorton andMetrick (2012) show that AAA-rated asset backed securities have signicantly
higher cumulative default rates compared to AAA-rated corporate bonds. This is also
true for lower rating categories, but the di¤erences lessen as ratings worsen. Cornaggia,
Cornaggia, and Hund (2013), also nd that structured products are overrated compared
to corporate issues, while municipal and sovereign bonds are underrated, over the sample
period 1980-2010. Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2011) nd that as MBS
issuance volume shot up between 2005 and mid-2007, ratings quality declined. Speci-
cally, subordination levels3 for subprime and Alt-A MBS deals decreased over this period
3The subordination level they use is the fraction of the deal that is junior to the AAA tranche. A
smaller fraction means that the AAA tranche is less protectedfrom defaults, and therefore less costly
from the issuers point of view.
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when conditioning on the overall risk of the deal. Subsequent ratings downgrades for the
2005 to mid-2007 cohorts were dramatically larger than for previous cohorts. Vickery
(2012) shows that rating ination occurred for subprime mortgage backed securities at
all investment grade rating levels, not just AAA. Gri¢ n and Tang (2012) show that CRA
adjustments to their modelspredictions of credit risk in the CDO market were positively
related to future downgrades. These adjustments were overwhelmingly positive and the
amount adjusted (the width of the AAA tranche) increased sharply from 2003 to 2007
(from 6% to 18.2%). He, Qian, and Strahan (2012) nd that top rated MBS tranches
sold by larger issuers4 performed signicantly worse (prices drop more) and have higher
initial yields than those sold by small issuers during the boom period of 2004 to 2006.
Stanton and Wallace (2012) demonstrate that the spread between CMBS and corporate
bond yields for ratings AA and AAA fell signicantly after 2002 (and did not fall for
bonds with worse ratings), when risk-based capital requirements for top rated CMBS
were lowered signicantly. Also, CMBS rated below AA were upgraded to AA or AAA
signicantly more than the rate observed in a comparable sample of RMBS leading up
to the crisis.
In the following subsection, we review related theoretical work. In Section 2, we
examine the problem of the issuer when there is no rating agency. In Section 3, we add
a CRA and analyze the second period. In Section 4, we look at the rst period of the
game, including an examination of what determines rating ination and welfare. Section
5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1.1 Theoretical Literature
The link between ratings quality and reputation is key for our results. Mathis, McAn-
drews, and Rochet (2009) examines how a CRAs concern for its reputation a¤ects its
ratings quality. They present a dynamic model of reputation in which a monopolist CRA
may mix between lying and truthtelling to build up/exploit its reputation. The authors
focus on whether an equilibrium in which the CRA tells the truth in every period exists,
4They dene larger by market share in terms of deals. As a robustness check, they also look at market
share in terms of dollars and nd similar results.
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and they demonstrate that truthtelling incentives are weaker when the CRA has more
business from rating complex products. Strausz (2005) is similar in structure to Mathis
et al. (2009), but examines information intermediaries in general. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro
(2013) incorporate economic shocks and show that CRA accuracy may be countercycli-
cal, which is also consistent with our results. Our model of reputation is similar to those
above, but the ability of the CRA to strategically structure what type of securities are
sold while at the same time rating those securities is new and links our work directly to
the phenomenon of structured nance.
In addition to Mathis et al. (2009), there are several other recent theoretical papers
on CRAs. Cohn, Rajan, and Strobl (2013) show that issuer manipulation of the signal
the CRA receives about asset quality may cause CRAs to exert less e¤ort in gathering
information. Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) examine how ratings-contingent regulation
a¤ects the informativeness of ratings. Fulghieri, Strobl and Xia (2014) focus on the
e¤ect of unsolicited ratings on CRA and issuer incentives. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro
(2012) demonstrate that competition among CRAs may reduce welfare due to shopping
by issuers. Conicts of interest for CRAs may be higher when exogenous reputation costs
are lower and there are more naïve investors. Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and Sangiorgi
and Spatt (2013) assume that CRAs relay their information truthfully and demonstrate
how ratings shopping may be distortionary. In Pagano and Volpin (2012), CRAs also
have no conicts of interest, but can choose ratings to be more or less opaque depending
on what the issuer asks for. They show that opacity can enhance liquidity in the primary
market but may cause a market freeze in the secondary market.
Hartman-Glaser (2013) models an issuer who plays an innitely repeated game with
reputation concerns. The issuer signals through amount retained, an explicitly costly
signal. In our paper, we focus on the ability of the issuer to select assets, while pooling
and issuing multiple securities can occur due to the clientele e¤ect.
In addition to their empirical results, An, Deng, and Gabriel (2011) have a theoretical
model where a portfolio lender can only pass o¤some loans because of the lemons problem
and must sell at a discount. Their results suggest that the magnitude of the lemons
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discount associated with portfolio loan sales varies positively with the dispersion of loan
quality in the pool and inversely with the sellers cost of holding the loans in its portfolio.
In the industrial organization literature, Albano and Lizzeri (2001) extends the frame-
work of Lizzeri (1999) and has a producer that can choose a quality of a good that is
unobservable to consumers but observable to a certication intermediary. The interme-
diary commits to a fee schedule and a disclosure rule. The optimal allocation involves
underprovision of quality. Our paper di¤ers in several ways. Rather than commit to a
disclosure rule, the rating agency in our model uses reputation as a disciplining device.
We also have heterogeneous investors.
2 The Model without a Rating Agency
We begin with two types of agents: an issuer and investors. All agents are risk neutral.
We will analyze the issuers problem rst without any rating agency, and then look at
the e¤ect of introducing a rating agency.
The issuer has assets of measure N , of which a mass  are good and worth G to
investors, and a mass N    are bad and worth B to investors. Good assets are worth g
to an issuer, while bad assets are worth b to an issuer.
We assume the following ordering:
b < B < g < G
The issuers valuations of the assets are lower than the investorsvalues for the assets.
This can occur for several reasons: the issuer may have valuable alternative investment
opportunities, regulatory capital requirements for holding the assets, and/or the need to
transfer risk o¤ of its balance sheet. The inequality of g > B indicates that issuers prefer
to keep good assets rather than sell them o¤ if investors perceive them as B.
There is a continuum of risk-neutral investors, each with a wealth of 1.5 Investors
can be one of two types: a measure IC > 0 of them are constrained and a measure
5This assumes that investors are credit constrained, which might arise from borrowing frictions (see,
for example, Boot and Thakor (1993)).
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IU > 0 of them are unconstrained. We will assume that the total value of all bad assets
is greater than the aggregate wealth of all investors: (N   )B  IC + IU . This means
that an issuer will always be able to replace a good asset with a bad asset, setting the
stage for a severe lemons problem. We will also assume that unconstrained investors have
enough wealth to buy all of the good assets, i.e. IU > G. This is completely for ease of
exposition and does not a¤ect results.
Constrained investors will only purchase securities that they believe are high quality
and have value of at least V . We assume that g < V < G, which implies that constrained
investors would not purchase a security that has a payo¤ of B and that constrained
investors must expect that some good assets will be included in a pool in order to purchase
a security.
Constrained investors may be constrained because of regulations (for example banks,
pension funds, and insurance companies are often restricted in the types of assets they
may hold), internal by-law restrictions, or because of their portfolio hedging requirements.
In practice, regulations currently require these types of institutions to hold investment
products that have specic ratings. We relax this requirement for two reasons. First,
regulations are being changed to weaken the dependence on ratings, and are tending
toward using institutional risk models.6 Second, we do not want ratings to be driven by
ratings-based regulation, which has been discussed amply in the literature (see Opp, Opp,
and Harris (2013) and White (2010)).7 Lastly, an important argument for securitization
is the clientele e¤ect, which is what we are directly modeling here.
The unconstrained investors are willing to purchase any security. They may be hedge
funds or other institutional investors. We assume both types of investor are rational in
6In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank bill mandates removing references to credit ratings and re-
placing them with alternatives. The alternatives suggested are using internal models in
conjunction with market and rating information (see http://www.nancialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/c_140429z.pdf?page_moved=1) The E.U., in the CRA III legislation, man-
dates eliminating the mechanistic reliance on ratings and nding alternatives. Alternatives
have not been settled on, although the internal ratings based approach is referenced (see
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/rating-agencies/docs/140512-fsb-eu-response_en.pdf).
7In a di¤erent version of this paper, we look at a model where constrained investors need certain
ratings. This model is more complex, but has very similar qualitative properties (although the inter-
pretation of those properties will vary given the interpretation of rating-based regulation versus quality
constraints).
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the sense that they update given available information and maximize their payo¤.8
The issuer can put together portfolios of good and bad assets through securitization.
We dene securitization as selling securities based on the payo¤s of the portfolio. We
restrict the space of securities by dening the payo¤ of a security as the average payo¤
of the underlying pool of assets. Letting i and i denote the measures of good and bad
assets backing a portfolio i of positive measure, the payo¤ for securities based on this
portfolio i will be (iG+ iB) = (i + i) ; and the quantity of such securities i + i.
In this model, the maximum number of di¤erent types of securities the issuer could
create are two: one for unconstrained investors (U), one for constrained investors (C).
The assets retained by the issuer (R) may be considered the equity slice. Securitization
changes the quality prole, but does not change the overall quality of the assets. The
constraints on securitization are:
U + C + R = ; (1)
U + C + R = N   : (2)
The rst equation says that the sum of the claims on good assets equals the amount
of good assets. The second equation is analogous for bad assets.
This, of course, is an extremely stylized model of how securitization works, in practice
things are much more complex (see Coval, Jurek, and Sta¤ord (2009) for a detailed
description of the process). In fact, the securities designed here resemble pass-through
securities, where investors get pro-rata shares of cash ows from the underlying mortgages.
We do not model the seniority structure/waterfall of non-pass-through securities.
We will assume that the demand by all constrained investors cannot be met, as there
is a scarcity of good assets.
8There has been much discussion about the naivete of investors in the RMBS market, e.g. see Bolton,
Freixas, and Shapiro (2012). However, not all structured nance markets are necessarily characterized in
such a way, as Stanton and Wallace (2012) point out: All agents in the CMBS market can reasonably
be viewed as sophisticated, informed investors.
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IC > V 
G B
V  B (A1)
The right-hand side of this equation describes the maximum value of the portfolio that
can be created for constrained investors. It is composed of a measure  of good assets
and a measure G  VV B of bad assets, resulting in a measure 
G B
V B of securities worth
V .
The constraint therefore says that constrained investors have more wealth than the value
of securities that could be generated for them. It follows that IC > V .
We also assume that the issuer cant observe investor types. This will not matter,
as the issuer can use simple incentive contracts (giving an epsilon more of surplus to
unconstrained investors) to perfectly screen them.
Issuers make take it or leave it o¤ers to investors. The reservation utility of all
investors is normalized to zero.
2.1 Full Information
Suppose that there is full information about the securitiesprole. The issuers payo¤
net of the initial value of the portfolio, (N   ) b + g, is (we will use the convention of
reporting net payo¤s in the rest of the paper):
(U + C) (G  g) + (U + C) (B   b): (3)
The full information prot-maximizing solution entails selling as many assets as pos-
sible to constrained investors, and securities worth B to all unconstrained investors. Note
that this dominates selling only to constrained investors as unconstrained investors place
a higher value on any remaining assets than the issuer does.
Lemma 1 The prot-maximizing allocation has:
1. A constrained pool containing all of the good assets and a measure of bad assets
(G  V )=   V  B such that the average value in the pool equals V ,
2. An unconstrained pool containing a measure IU=B of bad assets,
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The issuer thus engages in securitization by selling di¤erent securities to di¤erent
types of investors and retaining the remaining bad assets.
2.2 Asymmetric Information
When the quality of the issuers securities is private information, the issuer faces the
problem of persuading investors that the securities are of a certain quality. We will
demonstrate that this directly leads to a lemons problem. This is similar to the adverse
selection problem found in the empirical work of Downing, Ja¤ee, and Wallace (2009)
and An, Deng, and Gabriel (2011), who document a lemons spread and worse ex-post
performance when issuers have more scope for selecting the loans that are securitized.
We assume the issuer will o¤er a range of securities to investors with labels of their
quality. Investors will observe the total measure of assets issued against each pool (the
quantity of securities), i + i, and the reported measures of good and bad assets in
the pools, i and i, where i 2 fU;Cg. We employ the equilibrium concept of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. In the following lemma, we describe the equilibrium allocation.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the issuer will sell securities backed by a measure IU=B of bad
assets to unconstrained investors.
This represents a breakdown of the market typical for adverse selection problems.
The issuer cant include any good assets in equilibrium. If it did, and investors believed
the good assets were included and raised their valuations, the issuer would then replace
the assets with bad ones to capture the extra rents. This temptation leads to only bad
assets being sold.
The welfare loss from asymmetric information is equal to
(G  g)+ (B   b)  G  V  =   V  B ; (4)
the loss from being unable to sell securities backed by a mass  of good assets and a mass

 
G  V  =   V  B of bad assets to the constrained investors.
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3 The Model with a Rating Agency
In this section, we examine whether a rating agency can reduce or eliminate the asym-
metric information problem. We also study how ratings interact with the structuring of
the investments. We focus on a monopoly rating agency.
The CRA reduces the lemons problem through the reputation it acquires over time.
We model two types of rating agency: truthful (T ) and opportunistic (O). This follows
the approach of Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) and Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet
(2009) (who in turn follow the classic approach of modeling reputation of Kreps and
Wilson (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1984)). The opportunistic CRA will announce
the value for each security, but will choose its announcement and the structure on the
basis of its incentives. The truthful CRA is behavioral in the sense that it is restricted
to truthful announcements of security values, but is strategic in the way it designs the
securities. This is a signicant departure from the literature, which reduces the behavioral
player to a nonstrategic player.9 The literature generally uses the behavioral player as a
device to create reputational incentives for the opportunistic player. In our model, this
will limit the amount of rating ination (and mis-selling) the opportunistic CRA chooses
in the rst period.
Our model will have two periods. The CRA will be the same for both periods and
each period there will be a di¤erent issuer. For ease of exposition, we will begin by
describing a one-period version of this model. The probability of facing a truthful CRA
at the beginning of the period is given by the prior, , which, together with the structure
of the game and payo¤s, is common knowledge. We also assume the issuer knows the
type of the rating agency.10
The CRA observes perfectly the quality of the issuers assets and makes a take-it-
or-leave-it o¤er to the issuer. As part of its services, the CRA designs and rates the
9The only exception we are aware of is Hartman-Glaser (2013) where the truthful issuer can decide
how much to retain of a security.
10As the issuer knows the quality of its securities, this is the most natural assumption; otherwise,
both types of rating agency would be involved in a two-sided signaling game as in Bouvard and Levy
(2013), Frenkel (2012), and Bar-Isaac and Deb (2014). Other papers on CRAs do not need to make an
assumption about this as the issuer has no choice variable.
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securities o¤ered by the issuer for a fee f  0. This fee is unobservable to investors.
While in practice, the issuer will initially design the securities and get feedback from the
rating agencies about modications necessary to achieve certain ratings11, we incorporate
this back and forth into one step for simplicity. If the issuer does not use a rating agency
it may issue securities nevertheless. Therefore the issuer can get at least its asymmetric
information net payo¤ of IU (B   b) =B by not purchasing ratings. We will assume the
CRA incurs a positive, but arbitrarily small cost of issuing a rating. Hence, in any
equilibrium, the CRA is hired if and only if it can create additional surplus.
Denote a message that is sent by a CRA by m = (C ; U ; C ; U) and the set of such
messages by M , where i (i) is the reported measure of good (bad) assets in a pool
with securities intended for an investor of type i 2 fC;Ug. Denote the true measures
of assets by m = (C ; U ; C ; U). This message is equivalent to the CRA reporting a
quality (rating) of (iG+ iB) = (i + i) for securities of type i 2 fC;Ug, since we
assume the quantity of assets in each pool is observable.12
A strategy for a CRA of type d is a triplet sd = ( md;md; fd) 2 Sd, where Sd is the
strategy space of type d. Since we assume the true quantities are observable to investors,
any message m must fulll C + C = C + C and U + U = U + U . If the CRA
is truthful, then the strategy space is further restricted such that (C ; U ; C ; U) 
(C ; U ; C ; U).
Let  : M !  be the belief function of the investors, assigning a probability distri-
bution over the set of CRA types upon observing m, so that (dj m) is the conditional
belief that a CRA is of type d 2 fT;Og given a message m. Let V i ( m) be the investors
expected valuation of security i conditional on message m under the beliefs . Uncon-
strained investors are willing to pay a total of pU( m) = V

U ( m) for the unconstrained
securities, and constrained investors a total of pC( m) = V

C ( m) for the constrained secu-
11See details in Gri¢ n and Tang (2012). Rating agencies also provide their basic model to issuers to
communicate further. For example, Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) write, The CDO Evaluator software
[from S&P, publicly available] enabled issuers to structure their CDOs to achieve the highest possible
credit rating at the lowest possible cost. . . the model provided a sensitivity analysis feature that made it
easy for issuers to target the highest possible credit rating at the lowest cost.
12This is equivalent in the model to assuming that the quantity of securities issued against each pool
is observable.
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rities if V C ( m)  V (C + C) and pC( m) = 0 otherwise.
While we allow ratings to be continuous, in reality, CRAs use discrete ratings. In
principle, ratings correspond to ranges of default probabilities - although CRAs do not
publish the ranges corresponding to the ratings. Allowing for ratings from a continuous
range in the model has several benets. First, it does not make us impose an arbitrary
scaling and allows us to be general. Second, it allows us to abstract from rating at
the edge, i.e. setting securities to the lowest value of a prescribed range. While this
may have been an important phenomenon, rational investors should anticipate this and
adjust accordingly, thus undoing its e¤ect. Third, even legislation such as the Dodd-
Frank bill has recognized that structured nance ratings are di¤erent from corporate
bond ratings, meaning that in the model we are e¤ectively allowing the rating agency to
set its standards.13
Note that our assumption that (N   )B  IU +IC guarantees that the opportunistic
CRA has su¢ ciently many bad assets to create pools of size equal to the truthful CRAs
that contain only bad assets.
To summarize, the timing of the game with one issuer is as follows:
0. Nature selects the type d of the CRA.
1. The CRA o¤ers the issuer a contract for fee fd.
2. If the issuer accepts, then the CRA selects the measures of good and bad assets to
be included in each pool, and the measures of these assets to be reported (ratings).
Otherwise, the issuer selects the measures of good and bad assets to be included in
each pool and sells the securities itself, without any rating.
3. Investors observe the total quantity of assets and the reported measures of good
and bad assets in each pool (and whether it is the CRA or issuer reporting them)
and buy securities at their conditional expected value.
13For a basic metric, Gorton (2012) shows that asset backed securities have signicantly higher cumu-
lative default rates compared to equivalently rated corporate bonds. Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund
(2013) nd similar results.
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We suppose steps 1-3 are repeated in a second period, and that the issuer is di¤erent in
each period. If the di¤erent types of CRAs separate in the rst period, then second-period
investors update their priors about the type of the CRA accordingly. If the di¤erent types
of CRAs pool in the rst period, investors are still able to update their priors. The reason
is that in this case, we will assume that investors discover the type of the opportunistic
CRA between periods with a positive probability. This probability depends on the amount
of rating ination the opportunistic CRA chooses. We will dene this probability and
the dynamics explicitly in Section 4. Now, we focus on the second-period choices.
3.1 The Second Period
In this section, we will analyze the second period, when the type of the CRA has not
been revealed in the rst period and the posterior that the CRA is truthful is 2. Since
this is the last period, the opportunistic CRA has no reputation concerns. An alternative
interpretation of this section is that it analyzes a one-period version of the model.
Our rst result concerns the securities o¤ered by the issuer at the opportunistic CRA.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium of the second period, any security rated by the opportunistic
CRA will have a value of B.
Without reputation concerns, the opportunistic CRA has no incentive to include
good assets in the pool of assets to sell since the actual composition is not observable to
investors.
We say that an equilibrium is pooling if it has the property that both types of CRAs
report the same values of all securities and the quantity of securities issued are the same
(we will also include any equilibrium where both types of CRA are not hired in this
category). We call any equilibrium which is not pooling and where at least one type of
CRA is hired, a separating equilibrium.
Lemma 4 In the second period, there is no separating equilibrium.
This is an important result in the characterization of the equilibria. If there were a
separating equilibrium, the opportunistic CRA would be recognized and the best it could
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do is sell bad assets to unconstrained investors at fair value. As the issuer could do this
without the CRA, the opportunistic CRA would not be hired given the small xed cost
of operating.
Given this result, we examine pooling equilibria. The possible pooling equilibria where
CRAs are active could have securities sold only to unconstrained investors, securities sold
only to constrained investors, or two types of securities sold, one meant for each type of
investor. All of these possible pooling equilibria exist. However, after we rene the set
of equilibria, there will no longer be one where securities are sold only to constrained
investors.
Given the numerous equilibria that can be supported by a variety of o¤-the-equilibrium
path beliefs, we use the renement concept of Undefeated Equilibrium, introduced by
Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993). Placing restrictions on o¤-the-equilibrium
path beliefs using a concept such as the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) has lit-
tle bite in this environment, whereas the Undefeated Equilibrium concept selects a unique
equilibrium outcome for a given set of parameters. We give a brief intuitive discussion of
the concept here, and dene it formally in the Appendix.
The undefeated equilibrium concept is used to select among di¤erent Pure-Strategy
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBEs). In our setting, these are equilibria such that (1) each
type of CRA is using a pure strategy and maximizing prots given the investorsbids
and the other CRAs strategy, (2) each investor bids his expected value conditional upon
observed amount of securities issued and reported values, and (3) beliefs are calculated
using Bayesrule for amount of securities issued and reported values used with positive
probability.
A PBE, E, is said to defeat another PBE, E 0, if: (1) There is a message m sent only
in E. (2) The set of types K who send this message are all better o¤ in E than in E 0,
and at least one of them is strictly so. (3) Beliefs under E 0 about at least one type in K
are not a posterior assuming: (i) only types in K send m with positive probability and
(ii) those types in K that are strictly better o¤ under E send m with probability one. A
PBE is said to be undefeated if the game has no other PBE that defeats it.
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The undefeated concept essentially works by checking that no types in one equilibrium
are better o¤ in another equilibrium where they choose a di¤erent action/message.14
We now write two conditions which will help dene the parameter space for the unique
undefeated equilibrium outcome.
2(G B)b=B > g   b (C1)
2G+ (1  2)B  V (C2)
The rst condition says that if the posterior that the CRA is truthful is su¢ ciently
high in the second period, the truthful CRA strictly prefers to add one more good asset
rather than a bad asset to the asset pool being sold. The second condition states that
if the same posterior is su¢ ciently high, it is possible to serve constrained investors, in
spite of the fact that the opportunistic CRA includes only bad assets.
We now proceed to nd the undefeated equilibria.
Proposition 1 If and only if C2 holds, the unique outcome of any undefeated equilib-
rium, E, has two pools with the following features:
1. For constrained investors, the opportunistic CRA includes only bad assets, and the
truthful CRA includes all good assets and a measure

 
2G+ (1  2)B   V

=
 
V  B
of bad assets such that, given the opportunistic CRAs choice, the expected value of
a security backed by the pool equals V .
2. For unconstrained investors, both CRA types includes a measure IU=B of bad assets.
14While this works by comparing equilibrium payo¤s, Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993)
suggest this places more realistic restrictions on o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs than other concepts by
using beliefs from an actual equilibrium. In the examples they examine, this selects the most reasonable
equilibria. This concept is also used in several other papers, including Taylor (1999), Gomes (2000), and
Fishman and Hagerty (2003).
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3. Prots for the opportunistic CRA are:
 
V   b2(G B)=   V  B :
4. Prots for the truthful CRA are:
 
V   b2(G B)=   V  B  (g   b):
In the proposition, the unique undefeated equilibrium outcome has two pools: it
sells to both constrained investors and unconstrained investors. In the constrained pool,
the issuer at the opportunistic CRA puts in only bad assets, while the issuer at the
truthful CRA puts all of its good assets and enough bad assets to weakly satisfy the
constraint of the constrained investors (given the constrained investors expect a truthful
CRA with probability 2). Both put in only bad assets for the unconstrained pool. Both
pools are priced according to the rational expectations of investors, meaning the prices
are dependent on the investorsperception that the CRA is truthful. The opportunistic
CRA makes strictly larger prots than the truthful CRA as it receives the same price and
sells o¤more bad assets (and retains more good assets). The issuer with an opportunistic
CRA o­ oads more bad assets than if there were asymmetric information with no CRA.
Investors who interact with an opportunistic CRA see ratings above the actual value
of the securities o¤ered (ratings ination) and pay a price larger than the actual value for
those securities. In the next section, we will detail a mechanism whereby these investors
in the rst period will realize with some probability that there is a di¤erence between the
rating and the value. They will thus learn the CRA they are observing is opportunistic.
When they learn a CRA is opportunistic, they will ignore all of its future ratings, creating
a reputational punishment that will limit the amount of rating ination in the rst period.
For our next set of parameters, we nd a unique one-pool undefeated equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 2 If and only if C1 holds but C2 does not, the unique outcome of any
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undefeated equilibrium, E, has one pool for the unconstrained investors with the following
features:
1. The opportunistic CRA includes only bad assets, and the truthful CRA includes
a measure  of good assets and a measure (IU    (2G+ (1  2)B)) =B of bad
assets.
2. Prots for the opportunistic CRA are:
2(G B)b=B:
3. Prots for the truthful CRA are:
 (2(G B)b=B + b  g) :
In this proposition, the unique undefeated equilibrium outcome has one pool with
securities sold to all of the unconstrained investors. The truthful CRA places all of its
good assets in the pool, and as many bad assets as it can to satisfy the demand of the
unconstrained investors. The price of the securities reects the value and the perceived
probability that the CRA is truthful. Once again, the opportunistic CRA makes higher
prots than the truthful CRA.
For the last set of parameters, no CRA is hired:
Corollary 1 If C1 and C2 do not hold, any equilibrium, E?, has neither of the CRAs
being hired.
This follows from the proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. In these equilibria
the CRA cant generate value for the issuer, so the issuer does not hire the CRA but
issues securities of value B, which are purchased by unconstrained investors.
From the above, it follows immediately that any undefeated equilibrium where the
CRAs are hired has rating ination. For the equilibrium with two types of securities, the
constrained securitiesrating is equal to the value of what the truthful CRA is o¤ering,
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Conguration in Period 2.
but this is above the expected value by investors since the opportunistic CRA sells only
bad assets. For the equilibrium with one type of security, there is a similar type of
ination. Despite the potential for a large amount of rating ination, it is clear that
securitization improves welfare in the second period compared to the benchmark of no
CRA, as otherwise the issuers would not hire the CRA.
Given Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Corollary 1, we can now look at the equilib-
rium conguration, i.e. the parameter space for which each equilibrium exists.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium conguration has the following features:
1. If V b > Bg: for 2  V BG B , the equilibrium is of type E, for
V B
G B > 2 >
Bg=b B
G B ,
the equilibrium is of type E, and for
Bg=b B
G B  2, the equilibrium is of type E?.
2. If Bg  V b: for 2  V BG B , the equilibrium is of type E, for
V B
G B > 2, the
equilibrium is of type E?.
We do not prove the corollary, as it follows directly from the above propositions and
the assumption that V > g. We illustrate the equilibrium conguration in Figure 1.
The corollary provides several insights. First, a one-security equilibrium only exists if
V b > Bg. This reects the fact that the quality requirement of constrained investors is
high relative to the benet of retaining G assets and securities dedicated to constrained
investors will not always be sustainable. It also means that the benet of pushing B
assets onto investors is not that large, which makes it desirable to sell o¤ G assets to
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the unconstrained investors. Second, the two-security equilibrium exists when 2 is large.
This means that it takes a su¢ cient reputation for honesty to be able to sell to constrained
investors. Third, the larger the quality requirement of constrained investors, the less likely
it is that there will be a two-security equilibrium.15
In the next section, we proceed to the rst period and examine how the payo¤s of the
second period create reputation e¤ects for the opportunistic CRA and whether they can
eliminate conicts of interest.
4 The First Period
In this section, we will analyze equilibrium behavior in the rst period. We begin by
dening a reputation mechanism to link periods 1 and 2. We then extend the undefeated
equilibrium concept to a two-period game. Using these building blocks, we thereafter
nd the unique undefeated equilibrium outcome for a given set of parameter conditions.
4.1 Rating Ination and the Reputation Mechanism
We will introduce reputation concerns in the model by assuming that the type of the
opportunistic CRA is discovered with a positive probability between periods. We start
by dening rating ination - the variable z will be our measure of how inated (or
inaccurate) ratings are. We assume a functional form for z:
z = (OCG+ 
O
CB)  (OCG+ OCB) (5)
+(OUG+ 
O
UB)  (OUG+ OUB):
This represents the aggregate di¤erence between reported and actual values for all
securities issued. This depends on both the magnitude of the divergence between the
ratings and the actual quality and on the quantity of securities that had inated ratings.
It is important to include both dimensions in the reputation mechanism. CRAs are more
15This can be found directly from the corollary by shifting V .
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likely to be punished when they have poorer ratings quality and when that quality has
a¤ected more investors (as it is more likely to be observed and acted on).
Using the fact that OC + 
O
C = 
O
C + 
O
C and 
O
U + 
O
U = 
O
U + 
O
U we can simplify this
to:
z = (OC + 
O
U   OC   OU ) (G B) : (6)
The maximum level of rating ination occurs when the opportunistic CRA reports
that it has included all of its good assets (and possibly some bad assets), while it actually
has included only bad assets. In this case, z = (G B).
Dene p as the probability that the type of the opportunistic CRA is discovered after
period 1 ends and before period 2 begins. Each CRA wants to maximize its expected
discounted prots. Since the opportunistic CRA will not be hired in the second period if
its type is known, its expected discounted prots are given by:
O = O1 + (1  p)O2 :
Here, O1 represents rst-period prots, 
O
2 represents second-period prots, and  is
the discount factor.
We posit that the type of the opportunistic CRA will be more likely to be discovered
the more inaccurate its ratings are.16 More precisely, we assume p = 1 if the CRAs
separate in the rst period, and otherwise p = h(z). The function h is assumed to be
increasing, strictly convex, and continuously di¤erentiable on [0; (G B)], such that
h(0) = 0; h0(0) = 0, h((G   B))  1, and h0((G   B)) > g b
(G B)( V b) . As will be
demonstrated in the Appendix (see the proof of Lemma 8), this functional form rules
out corner solutions where the opportunistic CRA only includes bad assets (OU = 
O
C =
0) whenever the truthful CRA includes all of the issuers good assets, for the class of
equilibria we study.
16Note that in the CRA literature (e.g. Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2012), Mathis, McAndrews, and
Rochet (2009), and Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013)) the reputation mechanism is much simpler, as those
papers have an investment that is binary, and only defaults in the bad state. Therefore something rated
good that defaults leads directly to learning. Because of the generality of our setup, we dene this
mechanism as ex-post learning from the divergence between the rating and the realized performance.
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If there is no rating ination at all, the opportunistic CRA is secure and will earn
its full second-period prots. If there is rating ination and the opportunistic CRA is
discovered, it is not hired in period 2. If the CRAs type is not revealed in period 1, then
the equilibrium posterior in the beginning of period 2 that it is truthful is:
2 = 1=(1 + (1  p)(1  1));
where 1 denotes the prior at the beginning of period 1. It follows immediately from
this formula that 1  2, i.e. given that an opportunistic CRA was not found in the
rst period, it is more likely that the CRA is truthful.
We have already shown that there are no separating equilibria in the second period.
The following lemma extends this result to the rst period.
Lemma 5 There is no equilibrium where the CRAs separate in the rst period.
If the CRAs separated in the rst period, the opportunistic CRA wouldnt have any
business in any period and it would therefore have a protable deviation by mimicking
the truthful CRA. We can thus restrict ourselves to looking only at pooling equilibria.
In any pooling equilibrium where the CRA is hired, the opportunistic CRAs choice
of how many good assets to include in the pools, (OU ; 
O
C) must be optimal given the
rst-period message of the truthful CRA, (U ; 

U ; 

C ; 

U). Furthermore, the beliefs of
investors are held xed when the opportunistic CRA chooses the amount of good assets
to include, meaning that the choice does not a¤ect the price received. More specically,
(OU ; 
O
C ) must be a solution to the following maximization problem:
max
OU ;
O
C0
f(1  1)
0B@  OU + OC G+ 
U + 

U + 

C + 

C   OU   OC

B
1CA+
1 ((

U + 

C)G+ (

U + 

C)B)  IU (B   b) =B  
OU + 
O
C

g    U + U + C + U   OU   OC b+
(1  h( C + U   OC   OU (G B)))O2 g
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The rst two lines represent the opportunistic CRAs net revenues in the rst period.
As the price depends on the equilibrium beliefs of investors and the quantity is observable
and identical for both types of CRAs, net revenues are held xed in the choice problem
for the opportunistic CRA. The third line represents the opportunity cost of not holding
the assets. The fourth line represents the expected second-period prots. This consists
of the probability the opportunistic CRA will operate in the second period times the
discounted equilibrium prots in the second period. Note that the probability depends
on the opportunistic CRAs choice, as more distortion away from the reported value will
lower its likelihood of survival, but the equilibrium second-period prots do not, as the
beliefs of investors over the updated type of the CRA are held xed.
In any pooling equilibrium, the rst order conditions with respect to the amount of
good assets included in the constrained and unconstrained pools in period 1 are given by:
b  g + (G B)h0(z)O2  0; (7)
where the inequality can be replaced by an equality when OU > 0 or 
O
C > 0:
4.2 Equilibrium Denition and Assumptions
We will now characterize the equilibria of the two-period game. This game has multiple
equilibria and in order to select among them we would ideally like to apply something sim-
ilar to the undefeated equilibrium concept that was employed to the second-period game
in the previous section. However, the undefeated equilibrium concept is formally dened
for one-stage signaling games and therefore has to be amended to t our framework.17
Let the second-period game given prior 2 be the one-period game described in Section
3 where the prior is given by 2 and CRA payo¤s are dened by corresponding one-period
prots. Let the rst-period game be the one-period game described in Section 3 where
the prior is given by 1 and CRA payo¤s are dened by the rst-period prots plus the
17Mailath et al (1993) briey discuss the possibility of extending their concept to general games with
more stages and multiple players.
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discounted expected second-period prots in an undefeated equilibrium of the second-
period game given prior 2, where 2 is the posterior conditional upon the rst-period
actions and whether the CRAs type was revealed between periods.
Denition 1 We say that E is an undefeated equilibrium of the full game if:
1. For every prior 2, the restriction of E to the second period is an undefeated equi-
librium of the second-period game given prior 2.
2. The restriction of E to the rst period is an undefeated equilibrium of the rst-period
game.
In order to simplify the analysis, we will limit the parameter space to guarantee a
unique undefeated equilibrium outcome in the second period. This allows us to avoid
multiple discontinuities in the choice of rst-period rating ination, which depends on
second-period prots. The simplest way to do this is to rst assume
Bg  V b: (A2)
It follows from Corollary 2 (which is graphically depicted in Figure 1), that this limits
the second-period undefeated equilibria to two possibilities: two types of securities are
sold or the CRA is not hired.
The undefeated equilibrium where the CRA is not hired in the second period is of
little interest, as there are no reputational concerns and it reduces the rst period to the
static game that we had previously solved. Moreover, since 1 < 2 if the type of the
CRA is not revealed between periods, it implies the CRA would not be hired in the rst
period either. We will therefore make a second assumption to focus on the two security
equilibrium in period 2.
We will use the following notation to denote the posterior in period 2 if the oppor-
tunistic CRA is not discovered, 2(z) := 1=(1 + (1   h(z))(1   1)). The prots for
the opportunistic CRA (as given in Proposition 1) are
 
V   b2(z)(G B)=   V  B.
Plugging these second-period prots into the the incentive constraint (7), and replacing
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the inequality by an equality, we dene z implicitly by
h0(z)2(z) = (g   b)
 
V  B = (G B)2   V   b : (8)
Our assumptions about h() guarantee that that this equation has a unique and interior
solution for 1 su¢ ciently large.18 Our second assumption is that 1 is so large that
condition C2 holds for 2(z):
2(z
)G+ (1  2(z))B  V : (A3)
With this assumption, the undefeated equilibrium outcome in the second period is
unique and given by Proposition 1.
4.3 Undefeated Equilibria of the Full Game
The following two conditions will determine which type of undefeated equilibrium of the
full game will be observed.
((G B)  z (1  1)) b
B
  (g   b) +
V (1  1) ((G B)  z)
V   1G  (1  1)B
B   b
B
> 0 (C1)

 
G  V   (1  1) z (C2)
Condition (C1) implies that the truthful CRAs prots are positive in the situation
where it cannot place all of its good assets in the constrained pool. Condition (C2)
implies that the truthful CRA can place all good assets in the constrained pool and still
satisfy constrained investors.
Notice that the second-period game in section 3 can be described as a rst-period
game without reputation concerns, i.e. where the opportunistic CRA includes only bad
18This follows since h0(z)2(z) is a continuous and strictly increasing function of z on [0; (G B)]
such that h0(0)2(0) = 0 and h0((G B))2((G B)) > (g   b)
 
V  B = (G B)2   V   b if 1 is
so large that A3 holds.
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assets. We can see this directly from the above conditions - when we set rating ination
to its maximum (G B), C1collapses to C1 and C2collapses to C2.
We can now characterize the unique undefeated equilibrium outcome for a given set
of parameters, which we will do in Propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3 If and only if C20 holds, the unique outcome of any undefeated equilib-
rium of the full game, E, has two pools with the following features in the rst period:
1. The amount of rating ination by the opportunistic CRA is z as dened in equation
(8).
2. For constrained investors, the truthful CRA includes a measure  of good assets
and
C =
 
(G  V )  (1  1)z

=
 
V  B
of bad assets, and the opportunistic CRA includes a measure    z= (G B) of
good assets and C + z= (G B) of bad assets, such that the expected value of a
security backed by the pool equals V .
3. For unconstrained investors, both CRAs types include a measure IU=B of bad assets.
4. First-period prots for the opportunistic CRA are:
( V   b) ((G B)  (1  1)z) =
 
V  B  (g   b) + z (g   b) =(G B):
5. First-period prots for the truthful CRA are:
( V   b) ((G B)  (1  1)z) =
 
V  B  (g   b):
In E, a two-security equilibrium similar to E is played in the rst period, although
in E the opportunistic CRA will now include some good assets. More specically,
in the rst period all unconstrained investors will purchase securities of value B. The
constrained investors are sold as many securities as possible with an expected value
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of V . The truthful CRA will place all of its good assets and some bad assets in this
pool, whereas the opportunistic CRA will place a fraction of the good assets in order to
maintain reputation concerns, and ll the rest with bad assets. In E, the second-period
equilibrium outcome is E.
In the Appendix, we prove Proposition 3 by showing that given C20, the above equilib-
rium outcome maximizes both the truthful and the opportunistic CRAspayo¤s over the
set of potential pooling equilibria.19 Hence, the equilibrium outcome is not just Pareto
e¢ cient in the sense that no type could be made better o¤ without another being made
worse o¤. It goes beyond this to say that these are the equilibria both types of CRA
would select.
There is also a second type of undefeated equilibrium.
Proposition 4 If and only if C10 holds but C20 does not, the unique outcome of any
undefeated equilibrium of the full game, E, has two types of securities with the following
features in the rst period:
1. The amount of rating ination by the opportunistic CRA is zas dened in equation
(8).
2. For constrained investors, the truthful CRA includes a measure
C =
(1  1) ((G B)  z)
V   1G  (1  1)B
of good assets and no bad assets, and the opportunistic CRA includes a measure
  z= (G B) of good assets and C   (  z= (G B)) of bad assets, such that
the expected value of a security backed by the pool equals V .
3. For unconstrained investors, the truthful CRA includes a measure  C of good as-
sets and (IU   (  C) (1G+ (1  1)B)) =B of bad assets, and the opportunistic
CRA includes only bad assets.
19Interestingly, if one replaced the 3 assumptions A2, A3, and C20 with the condition 1G+(1  1)B 
V , one would nd that any undefeated equilibrium of the full game is of type E.
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4. First-period prots for the opportunistic CRA are:
((G B)  z (1  1)) b
B
 (g b)+
V (1  1) ((G B)  z)
V   1G  (1  1)B
B   b
B
+
g   b
G Bz
:
5. First-period prots for the truthful CRA are:
((G B)  z (1  1)) b
B
  (g   b) +
V (1  1) ((G B)  z)
V   1G  (1  1)B
B   b
B
:
In E, two securities are issued and the opportunistic CRA allocates a mix of good
and bad assets to the constrained pool, but only bad assets to the unconstrained pool.
The truthful CRA, on the other hand, allocates some, but not all of its good assets to
the constrained pool, and a mix of good and bad assets to the unconstrained pool.20
This equilibrium shares many features of E. The amount of rating ination and
thus the opportunistic CRAs allocation of good assets to the constrained pool are the
same. The expected value of securities sold to constrained investors is still V and the
second-period equilibrium outcome is still E. The di¤erence is that in E, it is more
di¢ cult to satisfy the quality requirements of the constrained investors  the truthful
CRA cannot include any bad assets in the constrained pool and it cannot include all of
its good assets (given the equilibrium rating ination choice of the opportunistic CRA).
The truthful CRA sells the rest of its good assets to unconstrained investors. Notice
that as the opportunistic CRA allocates good assets only to constrained investors, there
is equilibrium rating ination for both types securities. In E, there was only rating
ination in the securities meant for constrained investors. Vickery (2012) shows evidence
of substantial rating ination at all investment grade rating levels for subprime RMBS.
Thus the di¢ culty in serving constrained investors, either because of their high quality
requirements or the lower quality of good assets, pushesrating ination to the securities
20One might wonder if the equilibria E and E exist given the assumed conditions. For E, footnote
20 demonstrates a simple condition that is easy to satisfy for which it exists. For E, we provide the
following example: Let h(z) = z2; b = 1=5; B = 1=3; g = 2=3; G = 1; V = 5=6;  = 3=2;  = 1=2;
and 1 = 6=10. It is easy to see that A2 holds. Solving numerically gives: z  0:726, implying
2(z
)G + (1   2(z))B   V  0:00707 (A3 holds), (G   V )   (1  1) z   0:0406 (C2does not
hold), and rst-period prots for the truthful CRA of approximately 0:0902 (C1holds).
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meant for the unconstrained investors. Conversely, when it is easier to serve constrained
investors, the ratings ination gets concentrated in their securities. This is consistent
with the experiment of loosened capital requirements described in Stanton and Wallace
(2012).
Our last result in the characterization is:
Corollary 3 If and only if C1and C2do not hold, no CRA is hired in any period.
The corollary is straightforward  if C2and C1do not hold, then an equilibrium
where the truthful CRA makes positive prots in the rst period is not possible.
4.4 Rating Ination
Using the above results, it is also straightforward to compute how rating ination changes
with the parameters in the equilibria E and E. In order to clearly understand the
dynamics, we will now mark each variable with a subscript t, t 2 f1; 2g, to denote which
period it is from. For example, the value of good assets for investors period 2 is given by
G2.
Proposition 5 In E and E, the rating ination by the opportunistic CRA in period 1
is:
1. Increasing in g1, B1, and V2
2. Decreasing in , 2, G1, G2, B2, b1 and 1:
Consider some of the second-period variables. Rating ination decreases if the pre-
mium for good or bad assets (G2 or B2, respectively) is larger, as second-period prots
will be larger and the benet to the opportunistic CRA of maintaining its reputation
is thus larger. Similarly, ination decreases with the fraction of good assets (2). This
set of results is quite interesting; if the quality of the future asset pool improves, then
there will be less ratings ination. This can be given a business cycle interpretation;
in recessions, there will be less rating ination than in booms. This is consistent with
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theoretical results found in Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013), Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro
(2012), and Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) and empirical results in Auh (2013).
Rating ination increases if second-period constrained investors demand higher quality
assets (higher V2) . This occurs because second-period prots are decreasing in the quality
requirement of constrained investors, as it is more di¢ cult to push securities onto them.
As second-period prots decline, the cost of inating ratings dissipates. Intriguingly, this
suggests that tighter constraints on investors decrease the quality of ratings through an
equilibrium e¤ect. Therefore stricter regulation surrounding the quality of assets that
nancial institutions, pension funds, or insurance companies may hold can backre as
CRAs lower their standards in response.
Rating ination goes down if the prior that the CRA is truthful in period 1 is larger.
The insight on the prior comes from the fact that the more likely the period 1 CRA is
truthful, the more there is to gain for the opportunistic CRA in period 2, implying it will
choose less rating ination in period 1 to increase the chance of survival. Interestingly,
one might posit that there should be a trade-o¤, as if the prior is larger, the opportunistic
CRA has higher gains from inating ratings in period 1. However, this is incorrect since
the gain from unilaterally deviating by reducing the quantity of good assets in the rst
period is independent of the price obtained then.
There is a subtle e¤ect with respect to the values rst-period investors place on good
and bad assets (G1 and B1, respectively). The reputation mechanism depends on the
amount ratings are inated. This amount, given in equation 6, represents the di¤erence
between perceived value and the actual value of the securities. The larger the termG1 B1
is, the more likely the opportunistic CRA will get caught (and punished by withdrawn
business) for inating its ratings, as the substitution of a bad asset for a good asset is
more likely to be noticed. Therefore, a larger G1  B1 leads to less ratings ination.
Lastly, rating ination decreases if reputation is more important, which is proxied for
by the discount factor .
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4.5 Welfare
It is natural to ask about the welfare e¤ects of rating ination. While we view the role
of the truthful CRA as providing reputational incentives for the opportunistic CRA, we
must incorporate both types of CRA into a welfare calculation. Given that all agents are
rational, rating ination will be detrimental to those investors who face the opportunistic
CRA, but benet those who face the truthful CRA. Therefore, it is not obvious ex-ante
that rating ination has a negative impact on welfare.
We provide here a welfare analysis for limited parameters, where the results are ana-
lytically tractable. Specically, we look at the welfare properties of E. Welfare is given
by the the weighted sum of CRA payo¤s for the two-period game plus the surplus of
the issuer. Note that the welfare of investors is implicitly included as their rents are
extracted. Welfare is thus given by:
W = 1T1 + (1  1)O1 + f1T2 + (1  1)(1  p)O2 g (9)
+(1 + )IU(B   b)=B:
Using this, the following comparative statics are straightforward to compute.
Proposition 6 The ex-ante welfare in any undefeated equilibrium of the full game E is
increasing in 1 and , and decreasing in V and z.21
Welfare increases in the probability of a CRA being truthful, 1, and in the measure
of good assets, . Both of these allow the total amount of assets sold to increase.
An increase in the probability of detecting rating ination will increase welfare. Trans-
parency and provision of historical data is benecial in this environment.
First period rating ination enters negatively into the expression of welfare. Rating
ination has a negative e¤ect because it decreases the amount of assets sold. The more
21The change in z is assumed to be the result of an exogenous change in the h function, which will
thus not a¤ect the other primitives of the model.
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ination there is, the harder it is to satisfy constrained investors and the amount of assets
sold to them must be restricted.
Welfare decreases with the minimum quality requirement of constrained investors,
V , as that reduces the possibility of selling assets. This suggests that any benets of
regulation that constrains investors, such as a reduced risk of nancial contagion, must
be traded o¤ with the reduced e¢ ciency of capital allocation. Further examination of
this trade-o¤ is beyond the scope of the current model.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the interaction between structured nance, credit rating agen-
cies, and investor clienteles. This is particularly important in the wake of the poor
performance of ratings for structured products.
We model rating agencies as long lived players with reputation concerns. They struc-
ture products with issuers for constrained and unconstrained investors. The presence of
constrained investors provides a new motivation for the pooling and tranching of assets;
catering to a specic clientele. We nd that when quality requirements for constrained
investors are higher, rating ination increases in response, as lower future prots create
more incentives to take advantage of current investors.
Reputation also drives the pooling of assets, as an opportunistic CRA wont only pass
o¤ bad assets when it has concerns about future prots. Increases in future prots from
better quality assets decreases current rating ination, implying that ratings agencies are
more accurate in recessions.
There are several future avenues of research to explore. It would be of interest to
add risk (and risk aversion) to the model, to relate our results to others in the literature.
Furthermore, we would also like to examine the role of competition and shopping in this
environment.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The issuers problem translates into the following optimization program:
max
U ;C ;U ;C0
f(U + C) (G  g) + (U + C) (B   b)g ;
subject to the constraints:
IU   UG  UB  0; (A)
  U   C  0; (C)
CB + CG  (C + C) V  0: (D)
Note that a restriction on the size of the constrained pool is redundant by Assumption
A1. We assign multipliers A, C, D to the above constraints and form the Langrangian
function L. Constraint (A) states that the unconstrained pool cannot have a value greater
than the wealth of the unconstrained investors IU . Constraint (C) states that the amount
of good assets that can be included is . Constraint (D) states that constrained investors
require a quality level of at least V .
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The Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions are as follows, where each inequality can be
replaced by an equality if the corresponding measure is positive:
@L
@U
= B   b  AB  0 (10)
@L
@U
= G  g   AG  C  0 (11)
@L
@C
= B   b+D  B   V   0 (12)
@L
@C
= G  g   C +D  G  V   0: (13)
1. From (10), it follows that A  (B   b) =B > 0, and hence that constraint (A) binds.
In fact, it must be the case that A = (B   b) =B, as A > 0 means all unconstrained
investors will be served and since G < IU this can only be the case if U > 0.
2. From (12), it follows that D  B bV B > 0, and hence constraint (D) binds. This
implies either that the constrained pool is empty or that each constrained security
has a value of V .
3. From (13), it follows that C  G  g +D  G  V  and constraint (C) binds.
Substituting the binding constraints into the objective function yields  (G  g) +
IU ( C)G
B
+ C(
G  V
V B )

(B   b). As this is increasing in C , the solution has C = 
and U = 0. This implies that U = IU=B and C = 
G  V
V B .
Proof of Lemma 2
If the issuer were to sell a positive measure of good assets in an equilibrium candidate,
it would have incentives to deviate and replace all good assets by bad assets since g > b.
Hence, the issuer cannot include any good assets in equilibrium, and therefore cannot
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serve constrained investors. If the issuer did not sell bad assets to all unconstrained in-
vestors in an equilibrium candidate, it would have incentives to deviate by selling bad
assets also to the remaining unconstrained investors  irrespective of investorsbeliefs.
On the other hand, there are no protable deviations from selling bad assets to all un-
constrained investors if out-of-equilibrium-path beliefs are that the security has value
B.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose there is an equilibrium where the CRA is hired where this is not true and the
some good assets are included. Then, since B < g, the opportunistic CRA could gain
by retaining the good assets backing the securities and replacing them with bad assets
(recall that there are always enough bad assets to do this since (N   )B  1) without
changing its reported values.
Proof of Lemma 4
In a separating equilibrium, the type of each CRA would be revealed perfectly. Hence,
the opportunistic CRA would only be able to issue securities worth B, by Lemma 3, and
it would thus only be able to sell to unconstrained investors. Since it could not create
any value, it would not be hired by the issuer.
The truthful CRA could not be issuing securities resulting in a positive surplus, or the
opportunistic CRA would have a protable deviation by mimicking the sizes and ratings
of its issues. Furthermore, if it were issuing securities worth B, it would not be hired.
Undefeated Equilibria: Denition and Application
In this subsection, we dene the concept of Undefeated Equilibria, as put forth byMailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1993). We begin with the denition of a Pure Strategy
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
In addition to the notation in section 3.1, we add the following. Denote an arbitrary
CRA type by d and the set of such types by D = fT;Og. Let p = (pU ; pC) be the vector
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of aggregate bids for the two types of securities. The prots to the CRA of type d are
denoted by (s; p; d). Let 1 m(d)= m be an indicator function that takes the value 1 if type
d sends message m. Finally, dene the probability function (d) such that (T ) =  and
(O) = 1  .
Denition 2 E = (s; p; ) is a Pure Strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) if and only if:
1. 8d 2 D : s(d) 2 arg maxs2Sd (s; p; d),
2. 8 m 2 M : pU( m) = V U ( m); and pC( m) = V C ( m) if V C ( m)  V (C + C) and
pC( m) = 0 otherwise,
3. 8d 2 D and 8 m 2M : (dj m) = (d)1 m(d)= m=
P
d02D (d
0)1 m(d)= m if the denomi-
nator is positive.
In words, a strategy prole and a belief function constitute a Pure Strategy Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium if: 1. each type of CRA is using a pure strategy maximizing prots
given the investorsbids and the other CRAs strategy, 2. investors bid their expected
value conditional upon observed amount of securities and reported values, 3. beliefs
are calculated using Bayesrule for amount of securities and reported values used with
positive probability.
Denition 3 A PBE, E = (s; p; ), defeats another PBE, E 0 = (s0; p0; 0), if and only
if:
1. 8d 2 D : m0(d) 6= m and K = fd 2 D : m(d) = mg 6= ;,
2. 8d 2 K : u(s; p; d)  u(s0; p0; d) and 9d 2 K : (s; p; d) > (s0; p0; d),
3. 9d 2 K : 0(dj m) 6= (d)(d)=Pd02D (d0)(d0) for some  : D ! [0; 1] satisfying:
d0 2 K and (s0; p0; d0) < (s; p; d0)) (d0) = 1, and
d0 =2 K ) (d0) = 0.
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In words, an equilibrium E defeats another equilibrium E 0 if: 1. there is a message m
sent only in E, 2. the set of types K who send this message are all better o¤ in E than in
E 0 and at least one of them is strictly better o¤, and 3. under E 0, the (o¤-the-equilibrium
path) beliefs about some such a type are not a posterior assuming only types in K send
m and that they do so with probability one if they are strictly worse o¤ than under E.
A PBE is said to be undefeated if the game has no other PBE that defeats it. In
order to apply the undefeated concept, we dene a payo¤-maximizing equilibrium as a
PBE that, for a given set of parameters, gives each type of CRA weakly higher payo¤s
than any other PBE.
We use the following lemmas to relate a payo¤-maximizing equilibrium to an unde-
feated equilibrium. Lemma 6 proves that any payo¤-maximizing equilibrium is unde-
feated. Lemma 7 is then used to show that there are no other undefeated equilibria
besides those which are payo¤-maximizing equilibria. Therefore the two concepts are
equivalent in our setting.
Lemma 6 A payo¤-maximizing equilibrium is undefeated.
Since no type can be strictly better o¤ in another PBE, it follows immediately from
the denition of an undefeated equilibrium that a payo¤-maximizing equilibrium, E, must
be undefeated.
Lemma 7 A PBE is defeated by another if the latter is weakly more protable for both
CRAs and strictly so for the truthful CRA.
Suppose there are two PBEsE and E 0 such that E is weakly more protable for both
CRAs and strictly so for the truthful CRA. First note that by Lemma 4, both equilibria
must be pooling (although the CRAs may not be hired in one of the equilibria). Second,
since (1) the truthful CRA is restricted to honest reports and (2) the truthful CRA must
use di¤erent strategies in E and E 0, the messages sent in the two equilibria must be
di¤erent, m 6= m0(if the CRAs are not hired in one of the equilibria, the corresponding
message is empty). Third, beliefs in E 0 given the message m cannot be a posterior
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assuming the truthful CRA sends this message with probability one, or it would have a
protable unilateral deviation. Therefore, E defeats E 0:
Subsequently, it su¢ ces to nd a payo¤-maximizing equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
Using Lemmas 6 and 7, we can restrict ourselves to look for a payo¤-maximizing equilibria.
We thus begin by nding the equilibria that maximize the prots of the truthful CRA.
We will then show that these also maximize the prots of the opportunistic CRA.
By Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, this implies solving:
max
U ;C ;U ;C0
8><>: (U + C) (2G+ (1  2)B   g)+(U + C)(B   b)  IU (B   b) =B
9>=>;
The rst line represents the gain the truthful CRA makes by including good assets.
As the opportunistic CRA only includes bad assets, the price that the truthful CRA
receives reects this. The second line has two terms. The rst is the gain the truthful
CRA makes by including bad assets, which will be priced at B. The second is the surplus
the truthful CRA must give up to the issuer in order to be hired. Note that these prots
could be rewritten as coming from two di¤erent securities, but for simplicity we have
written everything in terms of aggregates.
This maximization is subject to the restrictions:
IU   U (2G+ (1  2)B)  UB  0; (A2)
  U   C  0; (C)
2 (CG+ CB) + (1  2) (C + C)B   V (C + C)  0: (D2)
Note that a restriction on the size of the constrained pool is redundant by Assumption
A1. We assign multipliers A2, C, D2 to the above constraints and form the Langrangian
function L. The subscripts signify that solution is for the second period. Constraint
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(A2) states that the value of the unconstrained pool, given that the opportunistic CRA
includes only bad assets, cannot be greater than the wealth of the unconstrained investors
IU . Constraint (C) states that the amount of good assets that can be included is .
Constraint (D2) states that constrained investors require an expected quality level of at
least V .
The Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions are as follows, where each inequality can be
replaced by an equality if the corresponding measure is positive:
@L
@U
= B   b  A2B  0 (14)
@L
@U
= 2G+ (1  2)B   g   A2 (2G+ (1  2)B)  C  0 (15)
@L
@C
= B   b+D2
 
B   V   0 (16)
@L
@C
=
0B@ 2G+ (1  2)B   g   C+
D2
 
2G+ (1  2)B   V

1CA  0: (17)
1. From (14), it follows that A2  (B   b) =B > 0, and hence that constraint (A2)
binds. In fact, it must be the case that A2 = (B   b) =B, as A2 > 0 means all
unconstrained investors will be served and since G < IU this can only be the case
if U > 0.
2. From (16), it follows that D2  B bV B > 0, and hence constraint (D2) binds. This
implies either that the constrained pool is empty or that each constrained security
has a value of V .
3. From (15), it follows that C  2(G B)b=B+b g. Hence, if 2(G B)b=B+b g >
0, then constraint (C) binds.
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4. From (17), it follows that
C  2G+ (1  2)B   g + B   bV  B
 
2G+ (1  2)B   V

= 2 (G B)  g + B   bV  B2 (G B) + b
= 2 (G B)
 V   b
V  B

+ b  g
5. From (15) and (17), it follows that @L
@C
> @L
@U
if 2G + (1  2)B  V , i.e. if
constrained investors can be served then there will be no good assets in the uncon-
strained pool. Moreover, from the assumption that V > g follows that in this case
2G + (1   2)B   g > 0, and hence by (17) constraint (C) binds. Of course, if
constraint (C) binds, then it cant be the case that 0 > @L
@C
> @L
@U
(which would
imply C = U = 0).
The above implies that if 2G+(1  2)B  V , then the solution has C = , U = 0,
C = 
 
2G+ (1  2)B   V

=
 
V  B, and U = IU=B, giving strictly positive prots
of
 
V   b2(G B)=   V  B  (g   b).
If 2G + (1  2)B < V , then there are no securities for constrained investors. The
possibilities are either that (a) Condition C1 holds: U = , U =
IU (2G+(1 2)B)
B
, and
C = C = 0, or (b) Condition C1 does not hold: C = U = C = 0, and U = IU . The
rst gives prots of 2 (G B) b=B   (g   b) and the second implies zero prots.
Hence, if and only if C2 holds, then the prot-maximizing solution has C = ,
C = 
 
2G+ (1  2)B   V

=
 
V  B, U = IU=B, and U = 0. If and only if C2
does not hold but C1 does, then the solution has U = , U =
IU (2G+(1 2)B)
B
, and
C = C = 0. Finally, if and only if neither C1 nor C2 holds, then the solution has no
CRA being hired.
It is easy to see that these solutions can be implemented as equilibria. For example, if
beliefs are equal to the prior for any out-of-equilibrium message, they can be sustained.
The above equilibria also maximize the prots of the opportunistic CRA. If we denote
the truthful CRAs prots by T2 , then the prots for the opportunistic CRA (when hired)
can be written T2 + (U + C)(g   b). Since the partial of prots with respect to C is
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even higher than for the truthful CRA, if the equilibrium is payo¤ maximizing for the
truthful CRA, then it is as well for the opportunistic CRA. Therefore the above equilibria
are payo¤ maximizing equilibria, which, by Lemma 6, are also undefeated. It follows by
Lemma 7 that there are no undefeated equilibria with di¤erent strategy-proles since any
other equilibrium is less protable for the truthful CRA.
Proof of Lemma 5
In a separating equilibrium, the type of each CRA would be revealed perfectly. Hence,
by Lemma 3 the opportunistic CRA would only be able to issue securities worth B in
period 2, and it would thus not be hired then. This implies that it has no reputation
concerns and would never issue a security worth more than B in period 1 either, and as
it is separating in the rst period, it would not be hired in the rst period either.
The truthful CRA could not issue securities in period 1 resulting in a positive surplus
on its own, or the opportunistic CRA would have a protable deviation by mimicking the
sizes and ratings of its issues (with actual values equal to or lower than the reported).
Furthermore, if it were issuing securities worth B, it would not be hired.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
We will prove the propositions by showing that the equilibrium outcomes under E and
E yield each type of CRA a higher payo¤ than any other equilibrium outcome of the rst-
period game, thus demonstrating that they are payo¤-maximizing and that the truthful
earns strictly less in any other equilibrium, and thereafter invoke Lemma 6 and 7 to show
that they are the only undefeated equilibria. Throughout we assume A2 and A3, which,
by Corollary 2 implies that the undefeated equilibrium in the second period is of type
E.
We start with a number of useful Lemmata.
Lemma 8 If the incentive constraint (7) does not bind in an equilibrium where the CRAs
are hired, there is another equilibrium where both types are strictly better o¤.
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Suppose there is a payo¤-maximizing equilibrium where the CRAs are hired in the rst
period and where the incentive constraint does not bind. It follows from the opportunistic
CRAs rst-order condition (7) that this can occur only when the opportunistic CRA
issues only securities of type B. Furthermore, the truthful CRA keeps some, but not all
of its good assets. If it kept all of the good assets, the truthful CRA wouldnt be hired.
If it included all of the good assets, the incentive constraint of the opportunistic CRA
would be violated.22 To see this, note that (7) in this case could be written
h0( (G B))  (g   b)
 
V  B
2 ( (G B)) 
 
V   b (G B)2 ;
which is inconsistent with assumption A3 and the assumption that
h0((G B)) > g   b
 (G B)   V   b :
Dene  (z) := 
  
V   b 2 (z) (G B)=   V  B. An equilibrium candidate max-
imizing the truthful CRAs payo¤ must be a solution to the following program, where
the second-period prots are given by Proposition 1:
max
U ;C ;U ;C0
8>>>><>>>>:
(U + C) (1G+ (1  1)B   g)
+(U + C   IU=B)(B   b)
+ (z)   (g   b))
9>>>>=>>>>;
s.t.
IU   U (1G+ (1  1)B)  UB  0; (A1)
1 (CG+ CB) + (1  1) (C + C)B   V (C + C)  0; (D1)
(g   b) =(G B)  h0(z) (z)  0; (E)
Constraint (A1) states that the value of the assets in the unconstrained pool cannot be
greater than IU . Constraint (D1) states that constrained investors require an expected
22This implies that constraint (C), which says that the measure of good assets included is at most ,
used in Propositions 1 and 2, is redundant here and therefore left out.
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quality level of at least V . Constraint (E) is the opportunistic CRAs incentive constraint
(7).
We form the Lagrangian function L, with multipliers A1, D1, and E. Recalling z =
(U + C) (G B), we obtain the following Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions, where
each holds with equality if the corresponding variable is positive:
@L
@U
= B   b  A1B  0 (18)
@L
@C
= B   b+D1
 
B   V   0 (19)
@L
@U
= 1G+ (1  1)B   g + 0 (z) (G B) (20)
 A1 (1G+ (1  1)B)  E (G B) (h00(z) (z) + h0(z)0 (z))  0
@L
@C
= 1G+ (1  1)B   g + 0 (z) (G B) (21)
+D1
 
1G+ (1  1)B   V

 E (G B) (h00(z) (z) + h0(z)0 (z))  0:
1. From condition (18), it follows that A1  (B   b) =B > 0 . Given the assumption
that IU > G, U > 0 and A1 = (B   b) =B.
2. Condition (19) gives us D1  (B   b) =
 
V  B > 0.
3. If 1G+(1 1)B  V  0, then by the assumption in the text that V > g, 1G+(1 
1)B g  0. However, given that 0 (z) > 0, if this holds E must be positive, since
otherwise @L
@C
> 0. We also note that @L
@C
  @L
@U
= D1
 
1G+ (1  1)B   V

+
A1 (1G+ (1  1)B) > 0, implying that U = 0.
4. If 1G+(1 1)B  V < 0, then givenD1 > 0, it must be that C = C = 0, i.e. there
is no constrained pool. If additionally 1 (G B) b=B   g + b  0, then E must be
positive since otherwise @L
@U
> 0. If, on the other hand, 1 (G B) b=B  g+ b < 0,
then rst-period prots for the truthful CRA are negative. As fees are assumed to
be non-negative, this cant be the case.
Hence, if the CRAs are hired the solution must have all three constraints bind, and
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either U = 0; if 1G+ (1  1)B   V  0; or C = 0; if 1G+ (1  1)B   V < 0: This
uniquely determines all four variables. More importantly, it shows that the truthful CRA
is better o¤ if the incentive constraint binds.
Analogously to the above, an equilibrium candidate maximizing the opportunistic
CRAs payo¤ under the assumption that the incentive constraint does not bind must be
a solution to the following program:
max
U ;C ;U ;C0
8>>>><>>>>:
(U + C) (1G+ (1  1)B   b)
+(U + C   IU=B)(B   b)
+ (1  h ((U + C) (G B)))  (z)
9>>>>=>>>>;
s.t.
IU   U (1G+ (1  1)B)  UB  0; (A1)
1 (CG+ CB) + (1  1) (C + C)B   V (C + C)  0; (D1)
(g   b) =(G B)  h0(z) (z)  0: (E)
We obtain the Kuhn-Tucker rst-order conditions:
@L
@U
= B   b  A1B  0 (22)
@L
@C
= B   b+D1
 
B   V   0 (23)
@L
@U
= 1G+ (1  1)B   b+ (1  h (z)) 0 (z) (G B)  h0 (z)  (z) (G B) (24)
 A1 (1G+ (1  1)B)  E(G B) (h00 (z)  (z) + h0(z)0 (z))  0
@L
@C
= 1G+ (1  1)B   b+ (1  h (z)) 0 (z) (G B)  h0 (z)  (z) (G B) (25)
+D1
 
1G+ (1  1)B   V
  E(G B) (h00 (z)  (z) + h0(z)0 (z))  0
As in the previous case, constraints (A1) and (D1) must bind. Moreover, by constraint
(E),
 h0 (z)  (z) (G B)   g + b:
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This implies that
@L
@U
 1G+ (1  1)B   g + (1  h (z)) 0 (z) (G B)
 A1 (1G+ (1  1)B)  E(G B) (h00 (z)  (z) + h0(z)0 (z))
and
@L
@C
 1G+ (1  1)B   g + (1  h (z)) 0 (z) (G B)
+D1
 
1G+ (1  1)B   V
  E(G B) (h00 (z)  (z) + h0(z)0 (z)) :
Hence, by the same arguments as above, E > 0 and we obtain the same (one- and two-
security type) solutions as above. It remains to show that these solutions can be sustained
as equilibria. However, this follows trivially by assuming out-of-equilibrium path beliefs
that assigns probability one to the opportunistic CRA.
It follows that both types of CRA earn strictly higher payo¤s in the above equilibria,
where the incentive constraint binds, than in any equilibrium where this is not the case.
Lemma 9 If and only if C20 holds, E is a payo¤-maximizing equilibrium of the rst-
period game. If and only if C10 holds but C20 does not, the outcome of E is a payo¤-
maximizing equilibrium of the rst-period game.
We know from Lemma 5 that any equilibrium of the rst-period game where the
CRAs are hired must be pooling. Consider the objective function of the truthful CRA:
1(UG+ UB) + (1  1)
 
OUG+ (U + U   OU )B
  Ug   Ub+
1(CG+ CB) + (1  1)
 
OCG+ (C + C   OC)B
  Cg   Cb
 IU(B   b)=B + T2 (2);
where OU and 
O
C are the measures of good assets sold by the opportunistic CRA for the
unconstrained and constrained pools respectively, and T2 (2) is the second-period prots
of the truthful CRA in the unique undefeated equilibrium outcome of the corresponding
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second-period game. Note that we have proven (i) that the incentive constraint binds in
any payo¤maximizing equilibrium in Lemma 8 and (ii) there is a unique interior level of
rating ination z. This implies that T2 (2) does not change with respect to the choice
variables (as we are comparing equilibria).
The rst line of the objective function is the net revenue from the unconstrained
securities, i.e. price (which depends on 1) times quantity minus opportunity cost of
holding the assets. The second line is the net revenue from the constrained securities.
The third line has the surplus that the CRA must leave to the issuer and the expected
prots from the second period.
We are looking for the payo¤-maximizing equilibrium, which implies that this expres-
sion should be maximized with respect to all of the choice variables U ; C ; U ; C ; 
O
U ,
and OC given non-negativity constraints and the restrictions:
IU   1 (UG+ UB)  (1  1)
 
OUG+
 
U + U   OU

B
  0; ( A1)
  U   C  0; (C)
1 (CG+ CB) + (1  1)
 
OCG+ (C + C   OC)B

  V (C + C)
 0; ( D1)
 
U   OU

(G B) +  C   OC (G B)  z = 0; ( E)
C + C   OC  0; (F )
U + U   OU  0; (H)
where z is the ination when the opportunistic CRAs incentive compatibility con-
straint binds (equation 7). We know that this is the case from Lemma (8). Constraint 
A1

states that the value of the assets in the unconstrained pool cannot be greater than
IU . Note that due to assumption A1, a corresponding constraint for the the constrained
50
pool is redundant. Constraint (C) states that the amount of good assets that can be
included is . Constraint ( D1) states that constrained investors require a quality level of
at least V . Constraint ( E) is the binding incentive constraint. Constraints (F ) and (H)
state that in each pool, the opportunistic CRA cannot include more good assets than the
total measure of assets (good and bad) included by the truthful CRA.
We set up the Lagrangian L with multipliers named after each constraint ( A1; C; D1; E,
F , and H) and obtain the following (simplied) rst-order conditions. Each holds with
equality if the relevant variable is greater than zero.
@L
@OU
1
G B = 1  1  
A1 (1  1)  E  H=(G B)  0 (26)
@L
@OC
1
G B = 1  1 +
D1 (1  1)  E   F=(G B)  0 (27)
@L
@U
= B   b  A1B +H  0 (28)
@L
@U
= 1G+ (1  1)B   g   A1 (1G+ (1  1)B) (29)
 C + E (G B) +H  0
@L
@C
= B   b+ D1
 
B   V + F  0 (30)
@L
@C
= 1G+ (1  1)B   g   C + F+ (31)
D1
 
1G+ (1  1)B   V

+ E (G B)  0:
We can nd the unique solution in 5 steps.
1. Condition (28) implies that A1 > 0; and hence, by the assumption that IU > G;
U > 0, A1 = B b+HB :
2. Condition (30) implies D1  B b+FV B > 0. Hence, either there are no constrained
securities or the constrained securities have a value of V .
3. Solving for E from (27) and plugging into (31) gives: C  D1
 
G  V +G g > 0:
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Hence, the truthful CRA includes all of its good assets and the opportunistic a
measure   z=(G B) of such assets.
4. We have that
@L
@C
  @L
@U
= F H+(1G+ (1  1)B) (B   b+H) =B+ D1
 
1G+ (1  1)B   V

:
(32)
(a) If (32) is positive, then C =  and U = 0, implying F = 0 and D1 =
B b
V B .
From F = 0 follows that @L
@OC
> @L
@OU
, giving OC =   z=(G B) and OU = 0.
Hence, H = 0. Using the binding constraints ( A1) and ( D1) we can calculate
U = IU=B, and C =
 

 
G  V   (1  1) z =   V  B. This solution
exists if and only if 
 
G  V   (1  1) z, in which case C  0 and rst-
period prots, given by the following expression, are positive:
((G B)  z (1  1))
V   b
V  B   (g   b):
(b) If (32) is negative, which requires C = 0 (otherwise, the expression is equal
to

B b+H
B
+ B b+FV B

1 (G B) > 0) and 1G+ (1  1)B < V , then U = 
and C = 0. By constraints ( E) and (F ) follow that in this case 
O
C = 0 and
OU =    z=(G   B). By constraint ( A1), U = IU G+z
(1 1)
B
. First-period
prots in this case are given by
( (G B)  z (1  1)) b=B   (g   b):
(c) If (32) is zero, which like the previous case requires C = 0 and 1G +
(1  1)B < V , we can also have a solution where the truthful CRA places
good assets in both pools. It must entail OC > 0, or constrained investors could
not be served due to 1G + (1  1)B < V . Moreover, F = 0 since otherwise
OC = C , which is not consistent with D1 > 0. Hence,
@L
@OC
> @L
@OU
, implying
OU = 0: Solving for C from the binding constraint ( D1), using C = 0 and
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OC =   z=(G B); gives:
C =
(1  1) ((G B)  z)
V   1G  (1  1)B
and
U =

 
V  G+ (1  1) z
V   1G  (1  1)B :
The rst expression (C) is positive by the assumption regarding h
0((G  
B)). The second expression (U) is positive if 
 
G  V  < (1  1) z. This
inequality also guarantees 1G + (1  1)B < V , but not that rst-period
prots, given by the subsequent expression, are positive:
((G B)  z (1  1)) b=B   (g   b) +
V (1  1) ((G B)  z)
V   1G  (1  1)B
B   b
B
:
5. By comparing the prots of the three candidates follows that (a) is a solution
if and only if 
 
G  V   (1  1) z, and that (c) is a solution if and only if

 
G  V  < (1  1) z and rst-period prots are positive.
The prot-maximizing equilibria for the truthful CRA are prot maximizing also
for the opportunistic CRA. The reason is that given Lemma 8, ination in any prot-
maximizing equilibrium where the CRA is hired is given by z, implying that second-
period prots are xed and that the only di¤erence in rst-period prots between the
opportunistic and the truthful CRA is given by a constant, z g b
G B . Hence, the maxi-
mization problem for the truthful CRA also maximizes the prots of the opportunistic
CRA.
We are now in a position to complete the proof of Propositions 3 and 4. Propositions 1,
2, and Corollary 1 characterize the unique undefeated equilibrium outcome of the second-
period game for any prior 2. Lemmata 8 and 9 demonstrate that the restriction of E
and E to the rst period are the only payo¤-maximizing equilibria of the rst-period
game (although they can be supported by di¤erent beliefs) and therefore, by Lemmata 6
and 7, also the only undefeated equilibria.
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Proof of Proposition 5
As we noted in the text, we now apply time subscripts to all variables.
We know from above that there is a unique, interior solution z to the binding incen-
tive constraint (7). Moreover, since @ (h0(z)2(z)) =@z > 0, we can apply the implicit
function theorem to the function
k(z) := h0(z)2(z)  (g1   b1)
 
V2  B2

=2 (G2  B2) (G1  B1)
 
V2   b2

= 0
and immediately obtain the comparative statics with respect to parameter
x 2 g1; V2; ; 2; G1; G2; 1; B1; B2; b1; b2	 using
@z
@x
=  @k(z
)=@x
@k(z)=@z
:
It follows that z is increasing in g1, B1, and V2 and decreasing in , 2, G1, G2, B2, b1
and 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Substituting into and simplifying equation 9, we nd:
W =
 V   b
V  B  
g   b
G B

((1 + 1)(G B)  z(1  1)) (33)
+(1 + )IU (B   b) =B:
Di¤erentiating the welfare expression (33) gives:
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dW
d1
=
 V   b
V  B  
g   b
G B

(G B) + z   dz

d1
(1  1)

dW
d V
=  
 V   b
V  B  
g   b
G B

dz
d V
(1  1)
  ((1 + 1)(G B)  z(1  1)) B   b
( V  B)2
dW
d
=
 V   b
V  B  
g   b
G B

(1 + 1)(G B)  dz

d
(1  1)

dW
dz
=  
 V   b
V  B  
g   b
G B

(1  1):
The signs of the derivatives follow from two inequalities. The rst says that:
V   b
V  B  
g   b
G B > 0 (34)
To show that this inequality holds, note that we can rewrite it as V b
g b >
V B
G B . The
assumption of V > g in the text implies that V b
g b > 1, and A3 assumes that Condition
C2 holds: 2G + (1   2)B  V , or 2  V BG B . Given that 2 < 1, the inequality thus
follows.
The second inequality says that:
(G B)  (1  1)z > 0; (35)
which follows since
C + C = ((G B)  (1  1)z) =
 
V  B > 0:
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